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I
n 2010, the main topic of the year for
EMU financial markets was the sovereign
debt crisis. Despite the announcement of 
drastic consolidation measures, market par-
ticipants lost confidence in the sustainability 
of public finances in Greece and Ireland, and
to a lesser extent in Portugal and Spain as
well. The risk premiums for the government
bonds of these countries are still very high, 
in spite of the rescue operation orchestrated
by the EU and the IMF. 
Nevertheless, 2010 was also the bearer of
some good news – first and foremost, the
strong rebound in the world economy. At the
end of last year, global industrial production
already exceeded the level that it was at
before the strong recession in 2008, while
world trade was almost back at its pre-crisis
level. Emerging markets, for which overall
output in 2010 was already well above 
the 2008 level, continued to outperform
advanced economies significantly.
So what lies ahead for 2011? Tackling the 
sovereign debt crisis will doubtless remain 
a major challenge throughout the year.
However, credible headway on the consolida-
tion front, coupled with the political moves
that are likely to be taken at the EU summit
in March in terms of strengthening the
Stability and Growth Pact and shaping a
future crisis resolution framework, are likely
to help calm nerves in financial markets. This
should help to coax risk premiums back
down. Meanwhile, yields on German and US
government bonds are likely to continue to
creep up a little further.
A gradual return to normality within finan-
cial markets should favor further economic
development. Or, to put it a little more clear-
ly: I believe that financial markets are unlike-
ly to be a major disruptive factor. Current
economic indicators, such as purchasing
managers' indices, generally point towards a
continued upward trend for the global econ-
omy. Although the need for consolidation of
public finances, together with moves to rein
in private sector debt, will put a dampener on
global growth momentum, monetary policy
in the US, Europe and Japan will continue 
to have a stimulating effect. Furthermore, 
the ongoing economic catch-up process in
emerging markets will reinforce the global
recovery. All told, global output is expected
to grow by just shy of 3.5% in 2011, com-
pared with 4% last year. 
No economic outlook would be worth its salt
without at least a few words on the risks that
exist: in addition to an escalation of the sov-
ereign debt crisis (possibly associated with a
renewed flare-up of the banking crisis), the
biggest risks facing the economy and the
financial markets lie, in particular, in a sus-
tained surge in commodity prices, as well as 
in sharp exchange rate swings. Of these, 
commodity price-related risks are presently
the most probable. These have to be watched
closely, as they could undermine the strong
economic momentum in major economies
which is presently even outstripping earlier
expectations. 
EDITORIAL
Ladies and gentlemen,
Dear friends of the House of Finance,
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UNBIASED FINANCIAL ADVICE – WANTED BUT NOT FOLLOWED
U
sing data from a field study, we 
are among the first to examine the
demand side of financial advice and to show
that an offer of free and unbiased financial
advice is accepted by only 5% of the clients
approached. Of those clients who accept the
offer, only very few ultimately follow the
recommendations made. Thereby, the paper
contributes to the current discussion on con-
sumer protection in the context of financial
advice and questions the effectiveness of
supply side solutions, since better informa-
tion alone does not seem to improve the
decision making of private investors.
There is a large and growing body of litera-
ture on household finance that documents
that retail investors make serious investment
mistakes. Next to financial education, default
options or regulation (see Campbell 2006) on
financial advice is another potential remedy
for private households’ investment mistakes.
A survey of retail investors in Germany, for
example, indicates that more than 80% of
investors consult a financial advisor.
However, the literature also shows that the pro-
fessional advice given to retail investors is often
conflicting, and that retail investors who obtain
such advice actually worsen their investment
performance (see Inderst/Otta  viani 2009 and
Bergstresser et al. 2010). An obvious supply side
cure to improve portfolio efficiency and mitigate
the investment mistakes of retail investors is to
offer unbiased and theoretically sound financial
advice that brings advisees closer to efficient
portfolios. In other words, to speak colloquially:
‘If you build it, they will come’.
WHICH CUSTOMERS FOLLOW ADVICE?
We test whether this supply side solution
works. Can unbiased financial advice steer
retail investors towards efficient portfolios? To
answer this question, we work with one of the
biggest brokerages in Europe which has several
hundred thousand active retail customers. This
brokerage started offering financial advice to
about 8,000 of its customers, all of whom were
chosen randomly, in 2010. The advice was free
of charge for a limited period of time and, ex-
ante, unbiased – it was generated from a com-
mercial portfolio optimizer that improves port-
folio efficiency. This advice was also sound as it
substantially improved diversification. 
As we have data on all the retail customers con-
cerned, i.e. for those who accepted the advice
and also for those who did not accept the advice,
Utpal Bhattacharya 
Kelley School of Business,
Indiana University
Andreas Hackethal
Goethe University
Simon Kaesler
Goethe University
Benjamin Loos
Goethe University
Steffen Meyer
Goethe University
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including administrative data for the time before
the advice was offered and for up to ten months
thereafter, we can answer some key questions.
How many and which types of customers accept
the offer? If customers accept the offer, is the
advice provided followed? Does portfolio effi-
ciency improve for the average advisee who
accepts the offer? Does portfolio efficiency
improve for the average advisee who follows the
advice given? Are those investors most in need of
financial advice also the ones most likely to get it?
YOU CAN’T MAKE A HORSE DRINK  
By answering these questions, we explore the
demand side of financial advice. We link the rec-
ommendations of advisors with actual customer
behavior after the advice has been given. Firstly,
we find that only about 5% of clients (likely to
be male, older, richer, more financially sophisti-
cated, and also more likely to have a longer rela-
tionship with the brokerage) accept the offer for
free and unbiased advice. Secondly, as regards
those who accept the offer, the advice given is
hardly followed. Thirdly, portfolio efficiency
improves for the average advisee who follows
the advice, and it would also have improved for
those investors who accepted the general offer
but did not then follow the recommendations
made. Port  folio performance improves most for
less financially sophisticated investors. Fourthly,
it seems that those investors most in need of
financial advice are the ones least likely to get it
and vice versa. Overall, our results imply that
the mere availability of unbiased and theoreti-
cally sound financial advice is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for benefiting retail
customers. So, as the saying goes: ‘You can lead
a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink’.
These findings highlight that the optimization
of investment decisions made by private in  -
vestors is to a large extent a demand side prob-
lem, while regulators are currently focusing on
the supply side. In the U.S., a new agency called
the Con  sumer Finance Protection Agency was
created under the financial reform bill (i.e. the
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of
2010) to deal with mostly supply side problems.
Likewise, the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive (MiFID) implemented in Europe aims
to enhance protection of retail investors by
increasing the transparency of financial prod-
ucts. Moreover, in Germany, the new Securities
Trading Act forces financial services firms to dis-
close any fees (kickbacks, bonuses, etc.) related
to a (potential) product sale. Yet, more infor-
mation and disclosure is only valuable if cus-
tomers are able to translate these into better
investment decisions, which is found question-
able by this study. 
Our results apply not only to financial products
but also to patients’ adherence to medical
advice, which has been shown to be below 25%
(see Ver  meire et al. 2001). This is because
patients believe they know more than the doc-
tor, are lacking social support, or are simply
ignorant about what they are told. It is up to
future research to identify the factors that pre-
vent investors from following beneficial finan-
cial advice.
REFERENCES
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The full article is available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1669015
Figure 1: Time Line. The sequence of events in the field study (dates are of the beginning of the respective month)
t = -45 months
Pre-advice period
t = 0 months t = +5 months
Post-advice period
t = +10 months
Data begins Offer begins
First recommendation
Offer ends Data ends
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nsider trading has been quite a fasci-
nating topic of legal and economic
research, with the economic research on
this issue being divided – insider trading
is, on the one hand, considered to make a
desirable contribution to market efficien-
cy while, on the other, it is despised for
undermining transparency within capital
markets – and legal regulations unsure
about which theory to follow. 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH INSIDER TRADING?
Establishing precisely why we wish to pro-
hibit insider trading is more difficult than it
seems. At first glance, the underlying argu-
ment seems easy to grasp: the profit an insid-
er makes is necessarily linked to a loss that
someone else in the market incurs. Had the
insider not traded, his counterparty would
not have suffered a loss. Had he at least dis-
closed his inside information to the counter-
party, the latter would have knowingly
undertaken the risky transaction. Hence,
insider trading should be made illegal, first
and foremost for reasons of fairness. We find
versions of the fairness argument in early
decisions made by the U.S. Supreme Court,
as well as in a recent decision of the
European Court of Justice. This claims that
“the purpose of the prohibition laid down by
Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/62 is to ensure
equality between the contracting parties by
preventing one of them (…) who is (…) in an
advantageous position vis-à-vis the other
investors, from profiting from that informa-
tion to the detriment of those who are
unaware of it”. 
Looking closer, however, we find that there
seems to be nothing unfair about insider 
trading. Henry Manne was arguably the first 
to forcefully present the argument that insider
trading serves a useful function by quickly
bringing new information to the market, and
thereby moving the price of the affected secu-
rity towards a level which would be justified 
if this information were to be publicly known.
Refining his theory, economists have been
arguing that the insider’s counterparty only
seems to unfairly lose money. On closer
inspection, insider trading is a ‘victimless
crime’, and arguably even represents a pareto
efficient situation. The insider’s counterparty
receives the price it bargained for on the day
concerned. As prices have not yet adjusted,
the relevant security trades at a certain price
and other counterparties selling – or buying –
receive this very same price. Why, so the argu-
ment runs, should the counterparty enjoy the
windfall profit from trading with an insider? 
WHY DOES THE LAW PROHIBIT INSIDER TRADING?
European law has prohibited insider trading
since 1989, first under regulation for insider
trading, later under successor market manipu-
lation regulation. What are the underlying goals
of this regulation? Regulating insider trading,
despite its alleged positive impact, has been
advocated by a competing school of economic
thought in order to secure highly liquid capital
markets. Proponents of insider trading regula-
tion have tried to prove that markets without
efficiently enforceable legal rules against insid-
er trading function less smoothly. Investors
anticipate losses to insiders and consequently
ask for higher bid-ask spreads, making trans-
actions in such markets more expensive. This
effect, combined with a loss of confidence
within the market, leads – so the argument
runs – to adverse selection, causing investors
to leave the market entirely. It is along these
lines that the European legislator passed the
Insider Trading Directive and the later Market
Abuse Directive. Insider trading is seen as a
form of market abuse which needs to be pro-
scribed in order to “ensure the integrity of
Community financial markets”. These are
INSIDER TRADING IN EUROPE
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seen to depend on smoothly functioning
securities markets, on market integrity, and
on public confidence in these markets. 
WHAT IS THE INSIDER ACCOUNTABLE FOR?
If we join the European legislator in advocat-
ing insider trading regulation, this is only 
the start of trouble. Remember, most insider
trading laws provide for criminal law sanc-
tions. Consequently, legal drafting needs to
pay meticulous attention to the wording of
insider trading laws. The Market Abuse
Directive prohibits an insider from using his
information when making a relevant transac-
tion. Now, when is an insider using inside
information? To name some examples: I am
clearly using inside information if I am a CEO
of a bidder, about to launch a takeover, and
stock up on the target’s shares, expecting their
price to go up. Am I also using inside informa-
tion if I had entered into a contract to buy
these particular shares long before I knew, or
could have known, that the bidder would be
going for a takeover? In other words: is the
insider required to knowingly make use of
inside information when violating the law or
does the law content itself with the insider
objectively being in possession of inside infor-
mation.
U.S. securities law has addressed these ques-
tions under the ‘use’ or ‘possession’ approach,
with the latter being advocated by the SEC and
the former by most federal courts. In the case
of the Spector Photo Group, the European
Court of Justice dealt with precisely this 
issue under the Market Abuse Directive. The
Court discussed the previous regulation’s
wording which had prohibited the insider
from “taking advantage” of inside information,
clearly reminding us of a “use” standard. By
altering the wording of this regulation, 
so the Court argued, the lawmaker had want-
ed to move towards a “use” approach. Several
arguments led the Court to the conclusion 
that there is a presumption of “use” built in
the market manipulation regulation. The
Court held that a person in possession of
inside information and trading in the corre-
sponding securities is presumed to have
infringed the insider trading prohibition. 
The impact of this decision, both on German
insider trading laws in general and on crimi-
nally sanctioning insider trading, remains 
to be seen.
REFERENCES
Bainbridge, S. (2005)
“An Overview of US Insider Trading Law: Lessons
for the EU?”,
UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research
Paper No 05-5
Schoen, K. (1999)
“The ‘Possession versus Use’ Debate”,
148 University of Pennsylvania L Rev 239 
European Court of Justice (2010)
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Chris van Raemdonck v Commissie voor het
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[2010] OJ 2010, C 51, 6
The full article is available at: 
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INSIDER TRADING
A form of market abuse, 
undermining transparency within
capital markets, that should be
made illegal for reasons of fairness.
A desirable contribution to market
efficiency, that serves a useful 
function by quickly bringing new 
information to the market.
or ?
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A
t the meeting of G20 finance minis-
ters in mid-February 2011, an agree-
ment was reached on the monitoring of a
number of indicators to reduce “excessive
imbalances.” By April, this agreement shall
be completed by establishing “indi  cative
guidelines against which each of these
indicators will be assessed, recognizing the
need to take into account national or
regional circumstances.” The goal of such a
monitoring framework is to provide early
warning signals to policymakers about the
build-up of imbalances that could over
time, if unchecked, lead to a repeat of the
financial instability witnessed since 2007.
Underlying the inclusion of current
account balances in such an early warning
system is the view that large current
account imbalances among the main trad-
ing nations are a potential cause of finan-
cial instability. For example, William
White, Chairman of the OECD’s Economic
and Development Review Committee,
has pointed to “unprecedented spending
excesses in many countries” and “global
trade imbalances” as being among the root
causes of the economic and financial crisis.
Yet, what exactly constitutes a current account
‘imbalance’? The central message of the
research reported here is that current account
‘imbalances’ are difficult to identify in real
time. Any notion of current account ‘indica-
tive guidelines’ needs to carefully balance the
possible benefits from reducing instability in
international lending relationships against the
costs of impeding the flow of capital to its most
productive destination. As we illustrate, in the
specific case of the U.S. current account, what
appears ex post as an excessive movement of
the current account deficit from near zero in
the early 1990s to about 6% of GDP in late
2005 and early 2006 can be explained by stan-
dard economic theory – i.e. as the rational
response of households, firms and investors to
sustained shifts in trend growth expectations
of the United States vis-à-vis its main trading
partners. Although, in hindsight, the growth
prospects of the U.S. relative to the rest of the
world call for a substantially smaller current
account deficit, we argue that as of the early
2000s there were good reasons to believe that
a U.S. current account deficit of 5% of GDP
was not only sustainable, but, under plausible
assumptions, even optimal.
1 
TIME-VARYING TREND GROWTH EXPECTATIONS
The first part of our argument is the observa-
tion that real-time perceptions of long-term
growth prospects in developed economies can
change over time. In the United States, these
expectations shifted up substantially in the
late 1990s. One important source for measur-
ing these expectations is the Survey of Pro  -
fessional Forecasters conducted by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Although this
survey usually focuses on expectations at
shorter horizons, each February respondents
are asked to also provide their expectations of
various economic indicators over the next ten
years. Between 1998 and 2001, these long-
hori  zon expectations for labor productivity
growth increased from 1.5% per year to 2.5%.
Although a one percentage point change in
growth expectations may seem modest, if sus-
tained over a long period, the implications for
future income are very large. When combined
with the observation that growth expectations
in the main trading partners of the U.S. were
revised downwards slightly during the late
1990s as a consequence of the Asian Crisis of
1997-8, the increase in U.S. growth prospects
relative to these other countries was in the
LONG-RUN GROWTH EXPECTATIONS AND 
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES
Thomas Laubach
Goethe University
Michael U. Krause
Deutsche Bundesbank
Matthias Hoffmann
Deutsche Bundesbank
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Since 2005, most of this increase in growth
expectations has been reversed, largely due to
the slower labor productivity growth observed
in the U.S.
WHEN STANDARD ECONOMIC THEORY IS APPLIED
Clearly there seems to be a correlation over
time between revisions to growth expectations
in the United States relative to the ‘rest of the
world’ and the U.S. current account deficit.
But does this correlation imply causation? This
is where we resort to the standard two-coun-
try model of modern macroeconomics for the
study of growth and business cycles. The two
countries are interpreted as being the United
States and an aggregate of its main trading
partners. Our main innovation is that workers,
firms and investors do not know the true trend
growth rate of the economy but have to esti-
mate it from noisy data of observed productiv-
ity growth. This data is ‘noisy’ in the sense that
most productivity increases are short-lived,
but a small fraction is persistent and is, there-
fore, very important for expectations of future
productivity and incomes. When we feed his-
torical U.S. labor productivity data into our
model, two things happen: first, the resulting
trend growth estimates of our model agents
look strikingly similar to those of the Survey of
Professional Forecasters. Second, the graph
shows that the optimal (by definition) con-
sumption and investment choices of the
model’s agents lead to a deterioration in the
U.S. current account deficit of nearly exactly
the magnitude observed since the mid-1990s.
2
The logic here is simply that agents anticipate,
rightly or wrongly, large future income gains
and want to consume some of these right
away, and thereby borrow from abroad.
THE RIGHT KIND OF TARGET
When faced with uncertain future growth (as
well as demographic) prospects, it is difficult to
quantify what exactly constitutes an appropri-
ate current account balance for a country. In
producing ‘indicative guidelines’ for current
account balances, it will be important to go
beyond fixed numbers and to also take into
consideration factors such as whether these
balances reflect an expansion in consumption
or investment (as in the U.S. in the 19th cen-
tury) and the extent to which they mirror an
unusual allocation of resources between the
non-tradable and tradable goods sectors.
1 One example of large current account deficits that
in hindsight have been judged benign are the U.S.
current account deficits of the late 19th century.
These have been estimated to be 13% of U.S. GNP
during the 1860s, 4% during the 1870s, and
11% during the 1880s (Hakkio, 1995).
2 The simulation ends in mid-2009, when the U.S.
current account deficit narrowed sharply due to
the collapse in trade. Since then, the deficit has
widened again to nearly 4% of GDP.
REFERENCES
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Figure 1: Actual and simulated U.S. current account surplus
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T
aken as a whole, Landesbanks and
savings banks currently pose a con-
siderable financial risk to the Federal
Republic of Germany and the public
budgets. We believe that, given the partly
grave state of political disarray surround-
ing the bail-out and future structure of
Landesbanks, an open and critical public
debate on the future structure of this
sector is necessary. Our Policy Platform
White Paper “On a Fundamental Reor  ga  -
ni  sation of the Landesbanks and Savings
Banks Sector in Germany” was written in
an effort to start this debate.  
At present, major segments of the Landes  banks
sector have neither a sustainable business model
nor economically viable income or balance
sheet structures. Several Landesbanks have
been kept afloat by substantial government sup-
port predicated on the “too big to fail” argu-
ment. At first glance, the municipal savings
banks appear stable and seem to be unscathed
by the crisis. However, even though their busi-
ness model has weathered the financial crisis
decidedly better than that of Landes  banks, it is
not altogether free from weaknesses. The oper-
ating result is highly dependent on the maturity
transformation and on the net result from own
funds. Furthermore, savings banks – and hence
their municipal owners – are indirectly owners
of the Landesbanks via the regional savings
banks associations and are thus proportionately
liable for their losses. And they hold, to a large
extent, claims against Landesbanks, with figures
cited in the three-digit billion range. Should fur-
ther write-downs on the values assigned to their
ownership interests be required, the stability of
numerous savings banks would be at risk.
Savings banks, Landesbanks and regional build-
ing societies are integrated via various support
funds into a joint liability scheme. According to
the current system, savings banks and Landes  -
banks are liable to one another. Following the
abolition of state guarantees, the quality and
economic performance of this protection
scheme no longer meets the requirements.
Neither the funding of guarantee schemes 
nor the guarantee pool is likely to be sufficient
to bail out even a single larger Landesbank. 
PROPOSAL FOR A REORGANISATION OF THE GERMAN LANDESBANKS
AND SAVINGS BANKS SECTOR
Heinz Hilgert  
Former Chief Executive
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Jan Pieter Krahnen  
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SRIs
Formed from:
Merger of Landesbank segments with
metropolitan area savings banks
Functions:
– Retail banking, mid- and large caps
– Project financing and capital market
business (client-focussed)
– Municipal and real estate financing
business
Owners:
Municipalities and municipal 
associations
Savings banks
Non-SRI-integrated savings banks
Functions: Retail / private banking, SMEs Owners: Municipalities 
SZI
Formed from:
Integration of DekaBank, LBS,
Landesbank segments, insurance
companies 
Functions:
Verbundbusiness for SRIs and non-
SRI-integrated savings banks
Owners:
Holding owned by savings banks and
savings banks associations
LFBs
Functions:
Development activities under
“Agreement II”, if necessary
also for wind-down, dissolu-
tion, sale of non-sustainable
segments of Landesbanks
(e.g. agency within an
agency)
Owners:
Federal States, but liability
for legacies in keeping with
ownership structures of the
(former) Landesbank
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clusion that a reform must encompass the
entire “Lan  des  banks and savings banks” sector.
PRECONDITIONS OF A REFORM
Above all, a restructuring must lead to the devel-
opment of a business portfolio that is sufficiently
diversified, with corresponding profitability and
a reasonable risk profile. In our view, a form of
verticalisation is necessary for the restructuring
of the sector. Savings banks provide a natural
extension to Landesbanks through their private
and corporate client business; they offer stable
and competitive refinancing, by means of which
liquidity and profitability may be improved.
Conversely, the ties with Landesbanks enable
savings banks to systematically expand in the
upper medium-sized business sector and support
companies through a growth and internationali-
sation process. A reform should also lead to
financial institutions that are characterized by a
clear strategic orientation that aligns with that of
their owners. The institutions should be owned
either by the municipalities and the savings banks
associations or by the Federal States. Lastly, a
politically viable reform should strengthen com-
petition in the financial market.  
THE PROPOSED MODEL
On the basis of the stated basic requirements 
we present a possible reform concept. The three
components of our so-called tripartite model are:
1 A small number of Sparkassenregional -
institute (SRIs) [regionally integrated public
banks] which integrate savings banks and
the Lan  des  banks' direct client business
within a single metropolitan area. These
financial institutions conduct their retail
banking, project finance, capital market,
municipal and real estate financing busi-
ness, as well as special funds business for
institutional investors. The SRIs transfer
their Verbund business (joint business) to
the SZI (see below). They are owned by
municipalities and municipal associations.
2O n e   Sparkassenzentralinstitut (SZI) [national
fi  nancial service institution] centrally pro-
viding the Verbund business for the savings
banks and newly created SRIs. Its business
includes proprietary and client securities
business, syndicated lending, payment
transactions, mutual fund offerings, closed
funds and certificates, leasing and consumer
loans as well as building society and insur-
ance business. Regional building societies
are integrated into the SZI in the same way
as DekaBank and other banks with Verbund
business. As a holding company, the SZI is
the exclusive responsibility of the savings
banks and savings banks associations.
3 The Landesbanks’ parts for which integra-
tion into an SRI or the SZI is not a viable
option can be streamlined down to activities
approved un  der the Agreement II (“Verstän  -
digung II”) and merged with the public sec-
tor development banks of the Federal States 
to form Landes förder banken (LFBs) [state 
de  velopment banks]. The “competitive
bu  si  ness” may be sold off, and the legacies
may be transferred to a bad bank, which
implements the orderly winding down as
agency within an agency. Liability for the
wind-down facility of the Landesbanks
must be taken over by the legacy owners of
the Landesbanks on a pro rata basis and
cannot rest solely with the Federal States.
COURSE OF ACTION
In order to put the discussion on a socio-political
le  gitimate track we recommend the establish-
ment of a government commission with a 
cor      responding mandate to develop a proposal
ready for implementation with regard to the
restructuring of the savings banks and Landes  -
banks sector. This proposal is to be submitted
within a clearly established time frame and on
the basis of a clearly defined government agenda.
11
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SELECTED POLICY PLATFORM PUBLICATIONS
Böcking, H., Gros, M. (2010)
“Comment on the European Commission's Green
Paper ‘Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis’”,
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Gerlach, S. (2010)
“EU Economic Governance”, 
White Paper, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Gomber, P., Gsell, M., Lutat, M. (2010)
“Competition among electronic markets and 
market quality”,
White Paper, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Inderst, R. (2011)
“Wettbewerb und Finanzstabilität”,
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
For further information on the Policy Platform at the House of Finance and to
download our publications please refer to our website:
http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/policy_platform
The full article is available at: 
http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/policy_
plat  form/Landesbanks_savingsbanks
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THE DODD-FRANK ACT LEAVES A LOT TO BE DESIRED
V
iral V. Acharya is Professor of
Finance at New York University
Stern School of Business. His research
interests are in the regulation of banks
and financial institutions, corporate
finance, credit risk and valuation of cor-
porate debt, and asset pricing with a
focus on the effects of liquidity risk. He
co-authored and co-edited the recently
published book “Regulating Wall Street:
The Dodd-Frank Act and the New
Architecture of Global Finance”, John
Wiley & Sons, November 2010. On March
15 he presented the book at Goethe
University.
Which are the most important improvements
brought by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act?
Viral V. Acharya: The Dodd-Frank Act is the
most ambitious and far-reaching overhaul of
financial regulation since the 1930s. It is highly
encouraging that the purpose of the new finan-
cial sector regulation is explicitly aimed at iden-
tifying and dealing with systemically important
financial institutions (SIFIs). And it strives to
give prudential regulators the authority and the
tools to do so. Requirement of funeral plans to
unwind SIFI’s should help demystify their orga-
nizational structure – and the attendant resolu-
tion challenges when they experience distress or
fail. In the same vein the Volcker rule limiting
proprietary trading investments of SIFIs pro-
vides a direct restriction on complexity and
should help simplify their resolution. Equally
welcome is the highly comprehensive overhaul
of over-the-counter derivatives markets.
Which are the Act’s worst flaws?
Viral V. Acharya: The Act requires over 225
new financial rules across 11 federal agencies.
The attempt at regulatory consolidation has
been minimal. More importantly, from the
standpoint of providing an economically sound
and robust regulatory structure, the Act has
weaknesses on at least three important counts.
Government guarantees remain mispriced,
leading to moral hazard. E.g. there are sever-
al large insurance firms in the United States 
that can – and did in the past – build leverage
through minimum guarantees in standard insur-
ance contracts. Were these to fail, there is little
provision in the Act to deal adequately with
their policyholders. Taxpayer bailout is the most
likely outcome. These institutions remain too-
big-to-fail and could be the centers of the next
excess and crisis.
Individual firms are not sufficiently dis-
couraged from putting the system at risk.
Since the failure of systemically important firms
imposes costs beyond their own losses it is not
sufficient to simply wipe out their stakeholders.
These firms must pay in advance for contribut-
ing to the risk of the system. Not only does the
Act rule this out, it makes the problem worse by
requiring that other large financial firms pay for
the costs, precisely at a time when they likely
face the risk of contagion from failing firms. This
is simply poor economic design for addressing the
problem of externalities. Equally importantly,
certain pockets of shadow banking such as sale
and repurchase agreements (repo) and money
market funds are not adequately addressed.
The Act falls into the familiar trap of 
regulating by form, not function. The most
salient example of this trap is the Act’s overall
focus on bank holding companies, after clari-
fying that non-banks may get classified as 
systemically important institutions too and be
regulated accordingly. The story of the finan-
cial crisis of 2007–2009 was that financial
institutions exploited loopholes in capital
requirements and regulatory oversight to per-
form risky activities that were otherwise
meant to be well-capitalized and closely 
monitored. To be fair, the Dodd-Frank Act
does not ignore this in its financial reform. But
the basic principle that similar financial activi-
ties, or, for that matter, economically equiva-
lent securities should be subject to the same
regulatory rules is not core to the Act. 
“Regulating Wall Street: The
Dodd-Frank Act and the New
Archi  tecture of Global Finance”:
www.wiley.com/buy/
9780470768778
Viral V. Acharya
New York University
Stern School of Business
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Baums, T. (2011) 
“Eigenkapital: Begriff, Aufgaben, Sicherung”,  
Institute for Law and Finance Working Paper
No. 123, http://www.ilf-frankfurt.de/uploads/
media/ILF_WP_123.pdf
Bienz, C., Walz, U. (2010) 
“Venture Capital Exit Rights”,  
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Vol. 19, Issue 4, pp. 1071-1116
Cahn, A., Müchler, H. (2011) 
“Die Verantwortlichkeit der Organmitglieder
einer Sparkasse für den Erwerb riskanter Wert    -
papiere”,  
Festschrift Uwe H. Schneider, pp. 197-228 
Christelis, D., Georgarakos, D., Haliassos, M.
(2010) 
“Stockholding: Participation, Location, and
Spillovers”,  
forthcoming in Journal of Banking and Finance
Faia, E. (2011) 
“Macroeconomic and Welfare Implications of
Financial Globalization”,  
forthcoming in Journal of Applied Economics 
Gomber, P., Gsell, M., Lutat, M. (2011) 
“Competition among electronic markets and
market quality”, 
forthcoming at the 14
th Conference of the
Swiss Society for Financial Market Research
(SGF), Zürich
Haar, B. (2010) 
“Konsolidierung des Binnenmarktes im euro  -
päischen Gesellschaftsrecht in der aktuellen
Recht  sprechung des Europäischen Gerichts  hofs”,
Zeitschrift für Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht (GPR),
Vol. 4, pp. 186
Hinz, O., Hann, I., Spann, M. (2011) 
“Price Discrimination in E-Commerce? An Exa  -
mi  na  tion of Dynamic Pricing in Name-Your-
own Price Markets”,
Management Information Systems Quarterly
(MISQ), Vol. 35, Issue 1, pp. 81-98 
Kraft, H., Munk, C. (2011) 
“Optimal Housing, Consumption, and Invest  -
ment Decisions over the Life-Cycle”,  
forthcoming in Management Science
Kühn, C., Teusch, M. (2011) 
“Optional processes with non-exploding real-
ized power variation along stopping times are
làglàd”,  
Electronic Communications in Probability, 
Vol. 16, pp. 1-8
Langenbucher, K. (2011) 
“Zur rechten Konkretisierung angemessener
Vorstandsbezüge”, 
Festschrift Uwe H. Schneider, pp. 751  
Marekwica, M., Maurer, R. (2011) 
“How unobservable Bond Positions in Retire  -
ment Accounts affect Asset Allocation”,  
OR-Spectrum, Vol. 33, pp. 235-255 
Taylor, J. B., Wieland, V. (2011) 
“Surprising Comparative Properties of Mone  -
tary Models: Results from a New Monetary
Model Base ”,  
forthcoming in The Review of Economics and
Statistics
Wiesel, T., Skiera, B., Villanueva, J. (2011) 
“Customer Lifetime and Customer Equity
Models for External Using Company-Reported
Summary Data”,  
Journal of Interactive Marketing, Vol. 25, Issue 1,
pp. 20-22
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SCHÄUBLE ON THE LESSONS TO
BE LEARNT FROM THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS
Wolfgang Schäuble, Ger  -
many’s Federal Minister 
of Finance, gave a lecture 
on February 24 under the
CFS Colloquium event se  -
ries. Schäuble spoke about
the lessons governments
have to learn from the financial crisis. He
made an appeal for a wiser financial market
authority and better liability rules. He asked
central banks to not only concentrate on the
fight against inflation but also on securing
financial market stability and on preventing
financial bubbles. He further demanded the
implementation of a global financial transac-
tion tax. Europe should take the first step in
this direction. Favoring non-European finan-
cial markets in doing so should not be taken as
an excuse for inaction. 
14
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HELMUT GRÜNDL AND 
JAN PIETER KRAHNEN TO
ADVISE EUROPEAN
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 
Helmut Gründl, Professor
of Insurance and Regula  -
tion and Managing Director
of the International Center
for Insurance Regulation
(ICIR) at the House of Fi  -
nan  ce, has been appointed
a member of the Insurance and Reinsurance
Stakeholder Group of the European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).
EIOPA is part of the newly created European
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS).
Jan Pieter Krahnen, Pro  -
fessor of Corporate Finance
at the House of Finance and
Director of the Center for
Financial Studies, has been
nominated a member of
the Group of Economic
Advi  sors for the Committee of Economic and
Markets Analysis (CEMA) of the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) –
another part of the ESFS. CEMA provides eco-
nomic expertise to ESMA by monitoring market
developments, identifying risks and vulnerabil-
ities, and providing impact assessments and 
cost-benefit analyses. The Group of Economic
Advisors has been set up to help CEMA with risk
identification and the development of relation-
ships with academics and market participants.
NEW ASSISTANT PROFESSOR TO
JOIN THE DEPARTMENT OF COR-
PORATE AND FINANCIAL LAW
Isabel Feichtner, who stu  -
died law in Freiburg,
Amsterdam, Berlin and
New York, will be joining
the Department of Corpo  -
rate and Financial Law as
an Assistant Professor. She
holds an LL.M. from Cardozo Law School and
a Ph.D. from Goethe University which was
awarded the 2010 Baker & McKenzie Prize.
Feichtner was previously a Senior Research
Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Com  -
parative Public Law and International Law in
Heidelberg. At Goethe University, she will
teach students in the Law and Economics of
Money and Finance Ph.D. program and con-
duct a research project on the transnational
law of natural resources. 
STEFAN GERLACH TO ADVISE THE SWEDISH
FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
Stefan Gerlach, Professor of Monetary Economics 
at the House of Finance and Managing Director of
the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability
(IMFS), has been appointed Scientific Advisor to the
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finans  -
inspektionen or FI). FI supervises and monitors all
companies operating in Swedish financial markets.
KENNETH ROGOFF WINS
DEUTSCHE BANK PRIZE IN
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 2011  
The Center for Financial
Studies (CFS) at the House
of Finance has awarded
the Deutsche Bank Prize
in Financial Economics
2011 to the US economist
Kenneth Rogoff. “Kenneth
Rogoff has not only contributed pioneering
work of the greatest academic importance, he
has also made his findings accessible to a broad
public”, said Jury Chairman and CFS Director
Uwe Walz. The academic prize, sponsored by
the Deutsche Bank Donation Fund, carries an
endowment of €50,000 and is awarded bian-
nually by the CFS in partnership with Goethe
University Frankfurt. Josef Ackermann, Chair  -
man of the Management Board and the Group
Executive Committee of Deutsche Bank, will
present the prize on September 22.
PETER GOMBER ELECTED MEMBER OF KEY
FRANKFURT STOCK EXCHANGE BODY
Peter Gomber, Professor of e-Finance at the Faculty
of Economics and Business Administration at Goethe
University Frankfurt, has been elected a member of
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange’s Exchange Council.
As controlling and supervisory body the Exchange
Council is responsible for the appointment, dismissal
and supervision of the management board. 
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QUARTERLY EVENT CALENDAR
JUNE
Wednesday, 1
st Goethe Business School 
Goethe Full-Time MBA 
“Application Deadline – Round 3”
Monday, 6
th EFL Jour Fixe  
5 pm “(Tax) Efficient Financial Advice – 
Myth or Truth”
Speaker: Lutz Horn
Tuesday, 7
th ILF Career Day
9 am – 5 pm
Thursday, 9
th –  CFS Research Conference
Friday, 10
th “Alternative Approaches to Modeling
9 am – 6 pm Systematic Risk”
Friday, 10
th CFS Research Conference  
8.45 am – 6 pm “The ECB and Ist Watchers XIII”
Organisation: Prof. V. Wieland, Ph.D
Tuesday, 14
th CFS Colloquium 
12.30 pm  “Resolving the Strains in Europe: 
Near-Term Measures and Long-Term
Prospects”
Speaker: Charles H. Dallara, Ph.D., 
Institute of International Finance
Tuesday, 14
th Finance Seminar  
5.15   – 6.30 pm Speaker: Prof. Alberto Plazzi, Ph.D., 
University of Lugano
Saturday, 25
th Goethe Business School Graduation
5.30 pm  “Executive MBA and Executive Master
of Finance and Accounting, Classes of
2011”
Thursday, 30
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar  
12 – 1 pm
Please refer to www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/eventlist.html 
for continuous updates of the event calendar.
MARCH – APRIL
Monday, March, 28
th – ILF Spring School 2011
Friday, April, 8
th  “Unternehmensrecht in der 
9 am – 6 pm Beratungspraxis”
Wednesday, March, 30
th  – Goethe Business School 4-Day Training 
Saturday, April, 2
nd “Financial Risk Management Part II”
Monday, 11
th IMFS Workshop 
9 am – 6 pm “Recent Developments in
Macroeconomic Policy”
Monday, 11
th Prize Presentation 
5 pm E-Finance Lab: Selected Landmark 
in the “Land of Ideas”
Thursday, 14
th Frankfurt Seminar in Economics  
12.15   – 1.45 pm Speaker: Prof. Luca Gambetti, Ph.D.,
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
Tuesday, 26
th Finance Seminar  
5.15   – 6.30 pm Speaker: Prof. Dr. Alexander Kempf,
University of Cologne
MAY
Monday, 2
nd EFL Jour Fixe   
5 pm “Solvency and Liquidity during the 
07-09 Financial Crisis”
Speaker: Jens Kruk
Tuesday, 3
rd Finance Seminar  
5.15   – 6.30 pm Speaker: Prof. Michael Brennan, Ph.D.,
UCLA Anderson School
Friday, 13
th House of Finance Conference 
8 am – 5 pm “Regulation & New Market Order”
Tuesday, 17
th Finance Seminar  
5.15   – 6.30 pm Speaker: Prof. Anders Trolle, Ph.D., 
École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne
Tuesday, 17
th – Conference  
Wednesday, 18
th “Banks' debt and monetary policy in the
euro area”
Organisation: Prof. Ester Faia, Ph.D. and ECB
Wednesday, 18
th IMFS Distinguished Lecture
Speaker: Anders Borg, 
Minister of Finance, Sweden
Hess. Landesvertretung Berlin
Thursday, 19
th CFS Workshop 
3 – 7 pm 
Thursday, 26
th ILF 3
rd Corporate Finance Summit 2011  
9 am – 6 pm 
Thursday, 26
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar  
12 – 1 pm “Fiscal Policy and Government Bond
Spreads in the Euro Area”
Speaker: Prof. Thomas Laubach, Ph.D.
Monday, 30
th CFS Presidential Lecture
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Josef Ackermann
Tuesday, 31
st  CFS Colloquium   
5 pm “Finanzkrisen im historischen Rückblick
und Lehren für die Zukunft”
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Michael Heise
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Contact Person:
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Tel. +49 (0)69 798 34000
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E-Mail: info@hof.uni-frankfurt.de
Internet: www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de
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